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A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
CLOSER TO REALITY?
Clare Pastore*
This is a promising time for an expansion of the right to counsel in civil
cases. The bench and the bar concur that there is a need for greater
access to counsel; some states have even created pilot projects to
provide legal assistance in certain civil proceedings to litigants who
could not otherwise afford it. Recent state legislation and state-court
rulings have also supported the right to counsel in certain civil
proceedings. Despite some setbacks, there is growing momentum for
expanding the right to counsel in civil cases, and it is imperative that
advocates of this right strategically build on the important progress
that has already been made. Advocates should seize the moment and
press legislatively for greater access to counsel, especially during the
current foreclosure crisis. Media exposure and the amicus
participation of judges can highlight the inequity that unrepresented
litigants face in court and bolster the need for counsel. Although
advocates for a "civil Gideon" should be attentive to systemic
constraints and competing interests that could threaten access to
justice, now is the time to strive to make it unthinkable for indigent
litigants to be denied counsel in civil cases where critical rights or
basic needs are at stake.
INTRODUCTION
By any measure, now is a time of great ferment on the issue of
whether publicly funded counsel should be more widely available to
litigants in civil cases who cannot afford to hire attorneys. As
discussed below, scholarship, conferences, bar association
resolutions, test cases, empirical research, legislative proposals, and
other initiatives supporting an expanded right to counsel have
* Professor of the Practice of Law, USC Gould School of Law, and Co-Chair, Right to
Counsel Task Force of the California Commission on Access to Justice. J.D. Yale Law School,
B.A., Colgate University. I am grateful for the research assistance of USC law students Ryan
McMonagle and Ian Maher, and for the support of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for
sponsoring the 2009 Civil Justice Symposium "Access to Justice: It's Not for Everyone," at
which this Article was presented.
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proliferated in recent years. In this Article, I propose to explain why
I believe an expansion of the right to counsel in civil cases looks
more promising now than at perhaps any time since just before the
Supreme Court's dreadful Lassiter v. Department of Social Service1
decision in 1981. I describe a few strategies that could usefully be
employed now to press for an expanded right to counsel and sound
two cautionary notes about the implementation of a broader right to
counsel.
Given the title of this Symposium ("Access to Justice: It's Not
for Everyone"), I must note the robust and important debate about
whether "access to justice" should be defined merely as the right to a
lawyer (or some other assistance) when a problem reaches a legal
forum, or as something much broader that involves access to the
political and judicial processes that shape our conceptions and
enforcement of rights and duties, and that encompasses assistance
before problems become framed as legal disputes and reach
adversarial forums. Deborah Rhode's 2 and Gary Blasi's 3 articles in
this Symposium, like others published elsewhere,4 make compelling
arguments for a much broader conception of justice than mere access
to attorneys. By focusing here on developments in the quest for a
right to counsel in civil legal disputes, I do not in any way mean to
imply that providing lawyers is always either necessary or sufficient
to achieve access to justice. The issue is similar to the perennial
legal services debate over whether resources should be concentrated
on impact work or individual client "service" work.5 Just as we must
1. Lassiter v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
2. Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 869
(2009). See also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004) (advocating, inter alia,
simplification of court procedures, increase in pro bono work, relaxation of unauthorized practice
of law and multidisciplinary practice rules, and tort law reform).
3. Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for Individuals, 42
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913 (2009).
4. E.g., Faisal Bhabha, Book Review, 24 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 85, 88
(2008) (reviewing ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007))
(noting lack of uniform definition of access to justice and discussing various conceptions); see
also David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 212 n.9 (2003).
5. See, e.g., Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J.
1529, 1576-77 (1995); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Chain, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some Comments on
Feldman's Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633, 1645-46 (1995); see also
Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United States, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT.
L. 11 (2003).
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assist individual clients with their legal problems and simultaneously
work for systemic reform, we must work for an expanded right to
counsel in legal proceedings as they are traditionally defined while
simultaneously pressing for a broader conception of justice.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MOVEMENT
FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This is indisputably a time of great attention to the need for
greater access to counsel in civil cases for those who cannot afford
counsel. Scholarship proposing doctrinal, empirical, and strategic
arguments for a right to counsel has blossomed in recent years, with
at least four major symposia held at law schools, and many important
articles published just in the last five years. 6 Well over one hundred
advocates now regularly participate in the National Coalition for a
Civil Right to Counsel, founded in 2004.' The American Bar
Association ("ABA") unanimously passed a historic resolution in
2006 endorsing the provision of "counsel as a matter of right at
public expense to low income persons in... adversarial proceedings
where basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving
shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody. . . ."' Numerous
state and local bar associations have endorsed the ABA resolution.9
In addition to lending whatever weight or prestige the ABA brings to
6. In addition to this Symposium, see 2006 Edward v. Sparer Symposium, Civil Gideon:
Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 501 (2006) (containing twelve articles on right to counsel topics); A Right to a Lawyer?
Momentum Grows, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167-293 (2006) (containing seventeen articles on
right to counsel topics); and An Obvious Truth: Creating an Action Blueprint for a Civil Right to
Counsel in New York State, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1, 1-539 (2009) (containing twelve articles on
right to counsel topics); see also Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest
Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603 (2009) (containing
papers from the ABA Litigation Section's December 2008 conference titled "Real People, Real
Needs, Real Solutions-Access to Legal Representation in Civil Litigation"); Paul Marvy &
Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to Expand the Civil Right to Counsel, 25
TOURO L. REV. 131 (2009).
7. Debra Gardner, Pursuing a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Introduction and Overview,
40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167, 168 (2006).
8. ABA House of Delegates Resolution 112A (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A1 12A.pdf.
9. According to the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, the ABA's resolution
has been adopted by the bar associations of, inter alia, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Washington, Boston, Chicago, New
York City, Philadelphia, King County (Washington), and Los Angeles County. National
Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/resourcesIbar-
resolutions (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
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the public and legislative debates, the ABA's resolution also
provides the necessary predicate for the nation's most influential
group of lawyers to file amicus briefs in appropriate cases, as it did
recently in Office of Public Advocacy v. Alaska Court System, an
important right to counsel case recently heard by the Alaska Supreme
Court. 10 State and local bar associations have likewise joined the call
for greater access to counsel as of right. The New York State and
Boston bar associations have recently issued substantial reports
analyzing the need and potential for expansion of the right to counsel
in their states. " The Boston bar is also spearheading a pilot project to
provide counsel to certain tenants in eviction proceedings in two
Boston-area courts. 12
Encouraging legislative developments have occurred as well.
As Laura K. Abel 13 discusses in this Symposium, seven states have
recently enacted laws expanding the right to counsel in certain civil
cases. A bill is currently pending before the New York City Council
to provide counsel as of right to low-income seniors facing eviction
or foreclosure, 14 and a separate effort is underway in the New York
State Assembly to provide counsel more broadly to homeowners
facing mortgage foreclosures. 15 In October 2009, California enacted
the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, establishing a six-year pilot
program (to begin in 2011), funded at approximately $11 million per
year, to test the effects and feasibility of expanding access to counsel
10. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
11. See BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT
COUNSEL, GIDEON'S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
MASSACHUSETTS (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr_0809/GideonsNew
Trumpet.pdf. Likewise, the Hawai'i Justice Foundation and state bar in 2007 recommended
specific steps toward a broader right to counsel. HAWAI'I STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
COMMUNITY-WIDE ACTION PLAN: TEN ACTION STEPS TO INCREASE ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
HAWAI'I BY 2010 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.hsba.org/resources/l/Documents/
Access%20to%2OJustice.pdf).
12. Boston Bar Proposal to Prevent Homelessness Gets Grant from Boston Foundation, (Jan.
7, 2009), http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr_0809/BostonFoundationGrantO 10709.htm.
13. Laura K. Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other Motivations
Behind New Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087 (2009).
14. Provision of Legal Services in Eviction, Ejectment and Foreclosure Proceedings, Int.
No. 648, available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=451623&GUID=
CAD2F1A6-C518-49E1-BB75-40C8B2CC1624 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
15. See Assem. B. No. A00464 (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/
?bn=A00464.
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in cases involving housing, domestic violence and other harassment,
conservatorships and guardianships, elder abuse, and child custody. 16
Likewise, there have been some successes in the courts. Several
state courts have held that when a state statute requires appointment
of counsel for parents in state-initiated proceedings to terminate
parental rights, equal protection requires such appointments in
privately-initiated termination cases. 17 More recently, in January
2009, the Washington State Court of Appeals held unanimously in
Bellevue School District v. E.S. that children have a due process right
to counsel in truancy proceedings. "8 While the court decided only
that due process requires counsel in truancy proceedings, its
language suggests an opportunity to apply the decision in other
contexts: "For purposes of due process, the issue is whether the party
has the mental capacity to represent his or her interests before the
court." '9 This framing certainly also implicates due process concerns
for litigants whose mental capacity precludes effective self-
representation even if they are not juveniles. 2 In 2007, building on
prior state case law holding that an indigent in a custody dispute is
entitled to counsel when facing an opponent with a publicly funded
16. CAL. Gov. CODE § 68650 et seq. Pilot programs must be collaborative efforts between a
court, a lead legal services agency, and other legal services providers in each jurisdiction which
successfully competes for pilot funds. Id. § 68651(b)(4). In its legislative findings, the new
statute draws heavily upon the work of a multi-year task force which I co-chaired, and which was
charged by California's Access to Justice Commission with drafting a model statute establishing
a civil right to counsel. See Clare Pastore, The California Model Statute Task Force, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 176 (2006), for more information about the process and the model
statutes.
17. See Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773 777-778 (Or. 1990); In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d
645, 650 (Iowa 2004); In re Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 751 (I11. 2002); Matter of
Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 2004); see also In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279
(Alaska 1991) (finding that due process requires appointment of counsel in private termination
cases).
18. 199 P.3d 1010, 1017 (Wash. 2009) (finding that because "[a] child's interests in her
liberty, privacy, and right to education are in jeopardy at an initial truancy hearing, and she is
unable to protect these interests herself," due process requires the appointment of counsel). The
case is now pending before the Washington Supreme Court. 210 P.3d 1019 (2009) (table)
(granting review).
19. Bellevue, 199 P.3& at 1015.
20. Indeed, even prior to Bellevue School District, a lower court in Washington reached the
conclusion that counsel was necessary in a truancy proceeding for a student with disabilities,
based on the reasonable accommodation requirements of Washington's court rule implementing
the Americans with Disabilities Act. In re Truancy of H.P., No. 00-7-02872-1 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 28, 2008); see also Lisa Brodoff et al., The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before
a Full Civil Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 609 (2004) (discussing arguments for the
appointment of counsel as a reasonable accommodation for litigants with disabilities).
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lawyer, 21  an Alaska trial court held that there is also a state
constitutional right to counsel for a parent in a custody action when
the other parent is represented by private counsel. 22 The case was
appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, where briefs supporting the
appointment of counsel were filed by the ABA and retired Alaska
judges, among others.23
Of course, the landscape includes setbacks as well, most notably
perhaps the failure of the 2007 test case King v. King24 in
Washington, in which the state supreme court rejected claims for
counsel in a child custody proceeding based on state constitutional
guarantees of due process, equal protection, and open courts.25 Other
test cases have resulted in courts refusing to address arguments for
counsel. 26
Despite the uneven landscape, there is undeniably growing
momentum on this issue. Some of the most important progress so far
is progress of the imagination, but more must be made: just as it is
now unthinkable to imagine the criminal process without attorneys
21. Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979).
22. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Gordanier v. Jonsson,
No. 3AN-06-8887 CI, (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://74.54.211.93/pdfs/
Gordanier/o20v/20Jonsson%20-%200rder/2OAppointing%20Counsel.pdf.
23. The briefs are available on the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel's Web site
at http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/advocacy/litigation/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (click on
the links under "Office of Public Advocacy v. Alaska Court System" to access the briefs). In
August 2009, the Alaska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot. Office of Public
Advocacy v. Washington Court System, No. S-12999, Order Dismissing Appeal (August 20,
2009). The Supreme Court noted that neither the court system nor the Office of Public
Advocacy, which had been ordered to and did provide representation to the indigent litigant, had
appealed the finding that due process requires representation, although the Office of Public
Advocacy ("OPA") sought to contest whether it should have been the entity required to provide
that representation. Id.
24. 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. 2007).
25. Id. at 668-69.
26. See, e.g., Kelly v. Warpinski, No. 04-29999-OA (Wis. Apr. 26, 2005), available at
http://wscca.wicourts.gov/caseDetails.do?caseNo=2004AP002999&cacheld=A3BF90DD74D3B
9D642D8473C4F773262&recordCount-l &offset=-0) (original writ in state supreme court
seeking appointment of counsel for defendants in civil suits, denied without opinion Apr. 26,
2005); Mitchell v. O'Brien, No. 072633 (Va. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://208.210.219.132/scolar/precaseinq.jsp~jsessionid=0000FQI5URSLOFYVAOIBQZO3TVA:
ulnfnluq) (unpublished decision dismissing on procedural grounds appeal from father seeking
appointment of counsel to oppose adoption of his child) (Feb. 13, 2009). The Maryland test case
of Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003), likewise did not produce the hoped-for
articulation of a right to counsel in custody cases. The issue remains open in Maryland, however,
because-over an impassioned dissent by three of the seven justices-the court declined to reach
the counsel issue after ruling for the formerly unrepresented litigant on the merits. Id. at 129.
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for both sides, so must it become unthinkable for indigent litigants to
be denied counsel in civil cases where critical rights or basic needs
are at stake. The legislative and judicial successes we have seen so
far do much to encourage that change of attitude about what is and is
not acceptable. Therefore, in a spirit of optimism, and in an effort to
help push the debate forward, I offer the following thoughts on
strategies.
II. STRATEGIES TO ADVANCE THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES
A. Seize the Moment
At this moment, the nation's attention is focused intently on the
economic crisis, and in particular, on the rising tide of home
foreclosures. At the same time, many have called for holding the
new administration to its promises of greater adherence to the rule of
law and principles of fairness. 27 While the crisis may seem to bode
ill for any new expenditures, it and the President's promises of
greater fairness also offer opportunities to illustrate the need for, and
press legislatively for, greater access to counsel. Surely many
Americans can relate to the unfairness, difficulty, and complexity of
defending against a foreclosure or illegal foreclosure-driven eviction
without counsel. A recent study by the Brennan Center for Justice
found that between 60 percent and 92 percent of foreclosure
defendants in certain jurisdictions were unrepresented. 28 New York
State's pending bill to provide counsel in certain mortgage
foreclosures is one example of a legislative initiative addressing this
high-profile, newsworthy problem. 29
27. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Democratic Pressure on Obama to Restore the Rule of Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at A32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/opinion/
14fri4.html?ref-opinion.
28. Melanca Clark & Maggie Barron, Foreclosures; A Crisis in Representation (2009),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/a5bf8a685cd0885f72-s8m6bevkx.pdf.
29. See A.B. A00464, 232d Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn-A00464. The New York State Bar President, Bernice K.
Leber, recently wrote about how tough economic times make the arguments for a broader right to
counsel even more compelling, both because help is even more widely needed and because the
failure to fund legal services now can have devastating consequences in terms of later public
service costs. Bernice K. Leber, And Justice for All, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N J., Oct. 2008, at 5,
available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfin?Section-Home&TEMPLATE-/CM/Con
tentDisplay.cfin&CONTENTID=20978. Notably, the federal economic recovery legislation
provided significant funds for legal assistance to homeowners in foreclosure, but created no
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Other events in the public eye may offer similar opportunities.
For instance, the media periodically expose the practices of some
managed healthcare companies of canceling or denying coverage in
outrageous circumstances. One example is the controversy in
California in 2006 over disclosures that Blue Shield of California and
Kaiser Permanente had retroactively denied coverage to patients after
they became seriously ill. 3 Advocates can use these types of
examples to highlight the power imbalance in court between an
ordinary person and a large, well-funded private interest, to
demonstrate the connection between procedural fairness and the rule
of law, and to press legislatively for an incremental increase in the
availability of counsel.
B. Use the Increasingly Sophisticated and
Persuasive Body of Research Regarding
the Effects of Counsel or Its Absence
Rarely is there a call for a civil right to counsel that does not
quote Justice Black's stirring language in Gideon v. Wainwright: 3
"[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth."32 Today,
however, the proposition that an unrepresented litigant is unlikely to
secure a fair trial is not only obvious but is supported by an ever-
greater empirical showing that the outcomes for those with and
without access to counsel are far from equal,33 and a related body of
entitlement or right to such assistance. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 110 P.L.
289 § 2305 (allocating $30 million to hire attorneys to assist homeowners who have legal issues
directly related to the homeowner's foreclosure, delinquency or short sale). See also Press
Release, Corp. for Nat'l and Cmty. Serv., National Service Agency Announces 10,000 New
Americorps Positions Funded by Recovery Act (May 14, 2009), available at http://www.national
service.gov/about/newsroom/releases-detail.asp?tb-pr.id=1341 (noting $1.2 million grant to
Equal Justice Works to assist victims of foreclosure crisis in five states).
30. See Lisa Girion, Kaiser's Retroactive Denial of a Twenty-Year Patient, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2006, at Cl, available at http://www.pnhp.org/news/2006/october/kaisers-retroactive.php;
Lisa Girion, Blue Cross Faces Fine for Voiding Policy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at Cl,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/22/business/fi-revoke22.
31. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32. Id. at 344.
33. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing
Data Reveal About when Counsel Is Most Needed, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2009)
(collecting studies).
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research regarding the extensive judicial resources required for cases
in which one or both parties are pro se. 34 These studies should be
central to any advocacy efforts on right to counsel issues, and further
empirical work should be encouraged.
Empirical data regarding the economic and social benefits of
providing counsel, as well as the costs of failing to do so, is another
important piece of the strategic puzzle. The National Legal Aid and
Defender Association has collected more than a dozen studies
including cost-savings and economic-benefit analyses from Florida,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
and Wisconsin. " A recent study from Texas concluded that for
every dollar spent on indigent civil legal services, the state economy
gained $7.42. 36 Likewise, the New York City Department of Social
Services concluded in 1990 that "every dollar spent on indigent
representation in eviction proceedings saves four dollars in costs
related to homelessness."37  Homelessness and health advocacy
organizations have likewise documented the costs to the public of
homelessness or lack of health care. 38 Such studies have obvious
34. See, e.g., Brief for Retired Alaska Judges as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Office
of Public Advocacy v. Alaska Court System (Alaska 2008) (No. S-12999), available at
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/Alaska%2Retired%20Judges%2OAmicus%2OBrief.PDF
(citing studies); see also Brief for Eleven County Judges as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition
Requesting Supreme Court Take Jurisdiction of Original Action, Kelly v. Warpinski (Wis. 2004)
(No. 04-2999-OA), available at http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/55800/
55816/55816C.pdf.
35. See National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Economic Benefit of Meeting Civil
Legal Needs, http://www.nlada.org/Civil/CivilLibrary/documentjbrowse (follow "Civil
Resources" hyperlink; then follow "Economic Benefit of Meeting Civil Legal Needs" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
36. THE PERRYMAN GROUP, THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AID SERVICES ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY IN TEXAS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EFFORTS AND EXPANSION POTENTIAL 3 (2009),
available at http://www.texasatj .orgiF[NAL%20Econ%20Impact%2OStudy/o2002-12-09.pdf.
37. Leber, supra note 29, at 5 (citing NEW YORK CITY DEP'T. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THE
HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION PROGRAM: OUTCOMES AND EFFECTIVENESS (1990)).
38. For example, the National Alliance to End Homelessness collects and summarizes
numerous studies documenting the lengthier hospital stays and consequently greater costs
typically incurred by homeless patients than by housed ones and the losses in future educational
achievement incurred by homeless children. See National Alliance to End Homelessness, The
Cost of Homelessness, available at http://www.endhomelessness.org/section/tools/
tenyearplan/cost (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). The Los Angeles County Homeless Services
Authority and the Economic Roundtable's recent Homeless Cost Avoidance Study finds that the
average public cost for impaired homeless adults decreases 79 percent when housed, from a
monthly average of $2897 to $605, with most savings coming from reduced healthcare
expenditures, especially hospital and emergency room usage. Where We Sleep: Costs When
Homeless and Housed in Los Angeles (November 2009), available at
http://www.lahsa.org/docs/Cost-Avoidance-Study/Where-We-Sleep-Final-Report.pdf. For a
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implications for arguments about the cost-effectiveness of providing
legal assistance to avoid homelessness.
C. Cultivate New Allies, Especially Among the Judiciary
The advocacy effort for an expanded civil right to counsel
depends heavily, and appropriately, on the "usual suspects": legal
services attorneys and directors, private bar pro bono leaders, access
to justice commissions, academic commentators, clients whose
stories reach legislators and judges, and advocates in substantive
areas such as health care or housing whose clients need attorneys.
And certainly a small number of judges have been calling for a "civil
Gideon" for decades, 39 while a much larger number regularly call for
greater pro bono efforts by the private bar.4 °  Some, such as
California's Chief Justice Ronald George, have supported legislative
efforts to expand the availability of counsel as a right in certain
cases.
However, an unusual and promising new development in some
of the recent litigation over a right to counsel in civil cases is the
amicus participation of retired-and in some cases sitting-judges.
Sixteen retired Washington state court judges filed an amicus brief
provocative critique of calculations of the benefits of legal services and suggestions for
improvement, see J.J. Prescott, The Challenges of Calculating the Benefits of Providing Access to
Legal Services, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
39. Indeed, the term "civil Gideon" was coined by a sitting judge in a 1997 lecture, later
expanded and published in the Yale Law and Policy Review. Hon. Robert W. Sweet, Civil
Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 503 (1998). Likewise,
Justice Earl Johnson, recently retired from the California Court of Appeal, has been a tireless
voice for a civil right to counsel for decades. See, e.g., Earl Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal Justice:
Where the United States Stands Two Decades Later, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199
(1994); Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The Globalization of
Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2 SEATTLE
J. SOC. JUST. 201 (2003); cf Quail v. Mun. Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App. 1985)
(Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting) (calling for recognition of right to counsel for indigent
tenant defending unlawful detainer).
40. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Themes in Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD 1, 2 (1995) (printing excerpts from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Pro Bono Work--Good
News and Bad News, Remarks at Pro Bono Awards Assembly Luncheon of the ABA in Atlanta,
Georgia (Aug. 12, 1991) ("While lawyers have much we can be proud of, we also have a great
deal to be ashamed of in terms of how we are responding to the needs of peoples who can't afford
to pay our services.")).
41. Jeff Bleich, The Neglected Middle Class, CAL. B.J. (June 2008), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney/o20Resour
ces/Califomia%20Bar/o2OJoumalJune2008&MONTH=6&YEAR=2008&sCatHtmlTitle=Opinio
n&sJournalCategory-YES (noting the Chief Justice's support for California civil representation
pilot project).
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supporting the arguments for counsel in the Washington test case of
King v. King, 4 2 as did eleven sitting or retired Wisconsin circuit court
judges in Kelly v. Warpinski. 43 Ten retired Alaska judges (identified
in the brief as having "more than 90 collective years of distinguished
service on the bench") filed a brief in the recent Alaska litigation
supporting the trial judge's ruling that an indigent litigant was
constitutionally entitled to counsel in custody proceedings when the
other side was represented. 4 These judicial officers are uniquely
qualified to bear witness and draw judicial and public attention to the
plight of unrepresented litigants, the burdens they pose on courts, and
the threat to equal justice that is posed by lack of representation.
The retired judges' brief in Washington State's King case
employed two of the types of empirical data discussed above,
reviewing studies supporting the argument that unrepresented
litigants receive less favorable outcomes and briefly noting the
effects of custody determinations and parent-child relations on
children's school achievement and life outcomes.45 The retired
judges' brief in the recent Office of Public Advocacy litigation in
Alaska focused on several effects of pro se litigation in contested
custody cases including the unfavorable outcomes for the litigants,
the difficulties faced by judges presiding over such cases, the costs in
time and efficiency to the judicial system, and the deleterious effects
on public confidence in the integrity of the system. 46 The Warpinksi
judges' brief focused on the effects of pro se litigants on the courts. 4 7
Judges should be encouraged to speak out even more about the
deleterious effects of the lack of representation on justice, and to lend
their amicus participation when their unique perspective is relevant
to a court's assessment of the need for counsel.
42. Brief for Retired Washington Judges as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, King v.
King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (No. 57831-6-I), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
a6906665ac25a77b80_yrm6by9qg.pdf.
43. Brief for Eleven County Judges, supra note 34.
44. Brief for Retired Alaska Judges, supra note 34, at 1.
45. Brief for Retired Washington Judges, supra note 42.
46. Brief for Retired Alaska Judges, supra note 34, at 4-23.
47. Brief for Eleven County Judges, supra note 34.
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D. Consider Arguments Based on the Court's
Inherent Power to Do Justice
The increasing and welcome involvement of judges in saying
out loud that justice is rarely achieved when one side is
unrepresented also suggests an additional legal argument for
appointed counsel, one based on the court's inherent power and duty
to do justice. Advocates have worked tirelessly and creatively to
develop doctrinal arguments for a right to counsel derived from
sources other than the federal constitutional provisions rejected in
Lassiter, including state constitutional due process, equal protection,
and open courts provisions. 48 As I have suggested elsewhere,49 a
potentially fruitful additional area for research and advocacy is the
scope of a court's inherent powers. Many courts have held, or have
noted in passing, that they inherently possess the power to appoint
counsel where necessary to fulfill the function of dispensing justice,
although actual appointments are admittedly rare. " A few courts
have flirted with state constitutional provisions or statutes granting
all necessary powers to courts in aid of jurisdiction,5 or with the
court's inherent "duty to ensure judicial proceedings remain truly
48. See, e.g., King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 691-96 (Wash. 2007) (discussing the due process,
equal protection, and open courts provisions of the Washington Constitution); Frase v. Barnhart,
840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003) (citing equal access to the courts, adoption of the English right to
counsel, due process, and separation of powers under the Maryland Declaration of Rights). Cf
Quail v. Mun. Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App. 1985) (Johnson, J., concurring and
dissenting) (calling for recognition of right to counsel based, inter alia, on the California
constitution's incorporation of English common law).
49. Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State Court Right-to-Counsel
Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186, 192 (2006).
50. E.g., Vick v. Dep't of Corr., 1986 WL 8003, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1986)
(finding that the court has inherent power to appoint counsel, but denying appointment to prisoner
because no showing that meaningful access to court in that instance was denied without counsel);
Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401,402 (Minn. 1984) (holding that the court's supervisory powers to
ensure fair administration of justice allow for appointment of counsel for indigent facing child
support contempt action, but only when incarceration is a real possibility); In re Smiley, 330
N.E.2d 53, 90 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that courts have authority to appoint but not to compensate
counsel); Caron v. Betit, 300 A.2d 618, 619 (Vt. 1972) (stating that the court has inherent "power
to require attorneys to serve and protect vital interests of uncounselled litigants where
circumstances demand it"); Piper v. Popp, 482 N.W.2d 353 (Wis. 1992) (explaining that although
under Lassiter there is no right to counsel for a prisoner in a tort case, the court has inherent
authority to appoint counsel in civil cases in order to ensure meaningful opportunity to be heard).
51. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson, 465 So. 2d 134, 138 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (citing LA.
CONST. art. V, § 2 as authority for payment of appointed counsel ("A judge may issue writs of
habeas corpus and all other needful writs, orders, and process in aid of the jurisdiction of his
court")).
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adversary"5 2 as possible justification for appointing or paying
counsel. But, again courts rarely choose to exercise the power they
proclaim.
One of the strongest and most detailed discussions of the court's
inherent power to appoint counsel came from the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in 1996, in a case overturning a state law that
prohibited the appointment of counsel for parents in child neglect
proceedings. " The state high court held that the statute violated the
separation of powers principle inherent in the state constitution,
because it intruded on the judiciary's inherent power to "appoint
counsel in furtherance of the court's need for the orderly and fair
presentation of a case."54 The court noted that such a case might
arise when a parent is "poorly educated, frightened, and unable to
fully understand and participate in the judicial process, thus . . .
obviously [in need of] assistance of counsel to ensure the integrity of
the [neglect] proceeding."55
The retired judges also urged consideration of an inherent
powers argument in the recent Alaska litigation. In a section titled
"The Court Has the Authority and Responsibility to Determine
Whether the Proper Administration of Justice Requires Appointment
of Counsel in Certain Cases," the judges outlined the court's duty to
assure that litigants receive a fair trial, and linked that duty to cases
in which the court has invalidated funding restrictions that threatened
the independence or functioning of the court.56 Likewise, advocates
52. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996). Here, the
Texas Supreme Court noted:
[W]e have never held that a civil litigant must be represented by counsel in order for a
court to carry on its essential, constitutional function. Indeed, thousands of cases each
year are prosecuted by pro se litigants. Nevertheless, we recognize that in some
exceptional cases, the public and private interests at stake are such that the
administration of justice may best be served by appointing a lawyer to represent an
indigent civil litigant.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
While several Texas cases cite this standard, only one reported case has actually used it to
appoint counsel, only to be reversed on appeal. Tolbert v. Gibson, 67 S.W.3d 368, 372-73 (Tex.
App. 2001), rev'd, 102 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. 2003).
53. Joni B. v. State, 549 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1996).
54. Id. at 414.
55. Id. at 414-15. The court went on to hold the statute unconstitutional under the Federal
Constitution as well, because it precluded the appointment of counsel even when due process as
construed in Lassiter required it. Id. at 415-16.
56. Brief for Retired Alaska Judges, supra note 34, at 23.
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in Frase v. Barnhart argued that the separation of powers provision
of Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which had
previously been construed to encompass the judiciary's inherent right
and obligation in the administration of the judicial process, supported
the court's power to appoint counsel where necessary. 57 A similar
argument was advanced in the Wisconsin case Kelly v. Warpinski.58
Further development of this line of argument is surely warranted.
E. Do More with Lassiter
My final strategic suggestion may seem counterintuitive to those
committed to establishing a broad and categorical right to counsel,
and indeed may be controversial among right to counsel advocates.
The suggestion is to embrace the Supreme Court's direction in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services that the need for counsel be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and use it to seek appointment of
counsel in individual cases.
Advocates and scholars typically, and rightly, view the Supreme
Court's 1981 decision in Lassiter as a terrible blow to the effort to
achieve a broad right to counsel in civil cases under a federal due
process framework. 59 in Lassiter, applying the familiar three-part
test for due process enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge," the Court
held that the Constitution does not require appointment of counsel as
a matter of right in state-initiated proceedings to terminate parental
rights. 6 Worse, the Court announced a "presumption that an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he
loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty."62
57. John Nethercut, Maryland's Strategy for Securing a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases:
Frase v. Barnhart and Beyond, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 238, 242 (2006) (describing arguments
in Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003)).
58. John Ebbott, To Gideon via Griffin: The Experience in Wisconsin, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 223 (2006) (describing Kelly v. Warpinski, No. 04-2999-OA, (Wis. Nov. 17, 2004),
litigation).
59. See, e.g., Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel
for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of
Durham, 36 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 363 (2005); Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again,
Justice Denied: The Overdue Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59 (2007).
60. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews factors are (1) the private interests at stake; (2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and probable value of the
safeguards sought; and (3) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens.
Id.
61. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
62. Id. at 26-27.
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Notably, however, the Court did not hold in Lassiter that due
process never requires the appointment of counsel when parental
rights may be terminated. Instead, it held that due process does not
always require it. The Court noted that "the complexity of the
proceeding and the incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be,
but would not always be, great enough to make the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the parent's rights insupportably high."63
Thus, the Justices specifically declined to "formulate a precise and
detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the
providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process
requirements,"' and instead left the appropriateness of appointment
in any individual case "to be answered in the first instance by the
trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review."65
It is remarkable that almost no published decisions show lower
courts actually taking up that challenge. In 2006, Paul Marvy of the
Northwest Justice Project and I read every one of the approximately
500 published state court decisions citing Lassiter and dealing with
requests for counsel. 66 Strikingly, only in Tennessee do the courts
seem to have taken seriously Lassiter's invitation to determine on a
case-by-case basis the need for counsel.67 After discussing the
Mathews factors, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held in 1990 that
in termination of parental rights ("TPR") cases, "the chance that the
failure to appoint counsel will result in an erroneous decision
becomes the main consideration. ' 68  The court listed seven factors
that bear on the question of whether counsel is necessary in any
individual TPR case:
(1) whether expert medical and/or psychiatric testimony is
presented at the hearing; (2) whether the parents have had
uncommon difficulty in dealing with life and life situations;
(3) whether the parents are thrust into a distressing and
63. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 32 (internal quotation omitted).
65. Id.
66. A full account of our analysis is found at Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview
of State Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 186 (2006).
67. The infrequency of Lassiter hearings in termination of parental rights proceedings in
most states has been noted in William Wesley Patton, Standards of Appellate Review for Denial
of Counsel and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Child Protection and Parental Severance
Cases, 27 LoY. U. CH. L.J. 195, 201-02 (1996).
68. Tennessee v. Min, 802 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
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disorienting situation at the hearing; (4) the difficulty and
complexity of the issues and procedures; (5) the possibility
of criminal self-incrimination; (6) the educational
background of the parents; and (7) the permanency of
potential deprivation of the child in question. 69
Rigorous application of these factors would certainly seem to
suggest that counsel should be granted in many if not all TPR cases,
and indeed, several Tennessee appellate courts have reversed or
remanded TPR decisions where there is no record of the trial court's
consideration of these factors, or where the trial court did not advise
indigent parents of their right to request counsel, even while
describing facts that make the termination of rights seem a foregone
conclusion. 7
There is no apparent reason why advocates elsewhere cannot
secure the same serious application of the Lassiter requirements as
Tennessee courts have required. 7 A strategy, perhaps implemented
by special appearances of counsel arguing only the appointment
issue, could aim at actually forcing courts to hold hearings, develop a
list of factors to consider, and make determinations of whether
Lassiter requires counsel in any given individual case. While it
would not establish a categorical right to counsel (and for this reason
is controversial among right to counsel advocates), this strategy
could secure counsel for many litigants who are currently
69. Id. at 627.
70. See, e.g., In re M.E., No. M2003-00859-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 1838179, at *11 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2004) (holding that right to counsel presumptively continues until court finds
parent no longer indigent); In re Adoption of J.D.W., No. M2000-0015 1-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL
1156628, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000) ("[A] parent's failure to request a court appointed
attorney prior to trial does not relieve the court of the obligations to inform the parent of his right
to be represented and to determine whether due process requires the appointment of counsel
where the parent is indigent."); In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that failure to inform parent of right to request counsel requires reversal); State Dep't of Human
Servs. v. Taylor, No. 03A01-9609-JV-00286, 1997 WL 122242, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19,
1997) (finding reversible error because the trial court failed to inform parent of his right to an
attorney and failed to consider factors set forth in Tennessee v. Min before denying counsel);
Adoption of Howson, No. 03A01-9302-CV-00072, 1993 WL 258783, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
12, 1993) (applying Min standards to privately initiated TPR and finding mother entitled to
counsel under Min's seven-factor test).
71. Texas advocates recently tried just such a strategy, seeking certiorari at the U.S.
Supreme Court for a case alleging that due process was violated by, inter alia, a Texas state
court's failure to conduct a Lassiter inquiry into the need for appointment of counsel in one
parental rights termination case. Rhine v. Deaton, 2009 WL 1866256 (June 25, 2009). The
petition for certiorari was denied. 2010 WL 250544 (Jan. 25, 2010).
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unrepresented, would likely create a body of cases documenting the
difficulties that pro se litigants face which could be useful both for
litigation and legislation, and might enlighten judges and the public
as to the quality of justice to be expected by unrepresented litigants. 72
Moreover, if advocates explored a strategy of entering limited
appearances for the sole purpose of seeking appointment of counsel,
courts of appeals might one day face the "innumerable post verdict
challenges to the fairness of particular trials" that helped persuade
the Court to overturn Betts v. Brady's case-by-case approach to the
need for counsel in criminal cases in favor of Gideon v.
Wainwright's categorical approach. "
III. Two CAUTIONARY NOTES
While the flood of recent legislative, advocacy, scholarly, and
court developments regarding the civil right to counsel is
encouraging, some caution is also in order. One cautionary note is
prompted by the phrase "civil Gideon" itself, the other by the
wariness of some legal services advocates about civil right to counsel
initiatives.
A. Be Careful What We Wish For
To advocates contemplating the current landscape of spotty and
unpredictable availability of civil counsel and the wide "justice gap"
between the legal needs of the poor and the resources available to
address those needs,74 the criminal defense model holds a certain
appeal. Yet the use of the term "civil Gideon," with its implicit
adoption of the public defender model as an aspirational goal, masks
some deep flaws in the public defender system. Advocates for a civil
right to counsel must be attentive to systemic constraints that
threaten access to justice in the criminal defense system, and take
72. It is important to note that this strategy is not without risks. As Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Lassiter discusses, an uncounseled parent is unlikely to be able to make the sort of
evidentiary record of entitlement to counsel under the case-by-case standard that would require
reversal on appeal if a trial judge denies counsel. Lassiter v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
50-51 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) and
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
74. HELAINE M. BARNETT, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., PREFACE TO DOCUMENTING THE
JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS (2005), available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf (estimating that 80 percent of
the legal needs of the poor go unmet).
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care not to replicate them on the civil side. Perhaps the most
significant of these constraints is caseloads that are sometimes too
high to allow adequate representation, a subject of frequent
lamentation, study, and even litigation.75 Funding, manner of
appointing counsel, delivery system, and minimum standards of
competence are all critical factors in determining the success of
publicly funded counsel.76  Collaboration between "civil Gideon"
advocates and experienced public defenders, judges, and bar leaders
is essential to avoid some of the problems plaguing the public
criminal defense system.
B. Be Attentive to the Potential for Conflicting
Interests Among Access to Justice Advocates
The prospect of increased representation for the indigent is
certainly a welcome one for advocates, clients, and judges. Yet the
actual implementation of a broader right to counsel is complicated.
For example, many judges, especially those who preside over family
law dockets clogged with pro se litigants,77 are eager for a place
where they can refer these litigants for assistance, without
necessarily distinguishing between cases where both parties are
unrepresented and those where one side has an attorney, or
75. See Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2008, at AI (describing litigation and advocacy in Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, New York, and Tennessee over public defender caseloads). In September 2008, a
Florida judge ruled that Miami-Dade County public defenders could refuse new lesser felony
cases so that the attorneys could competently handle the cases already on their docket. Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Public Defender's Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in
Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, In re Reassignment and Consolidation of Public
Defender's Motions to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No.
3D08-2272 (11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Order on motion_
to-appoint-otherscounsel.pdf. The order is now before the Florida Supreme Court. Most
recently, a Michigan court allowed a similar case to proceed. Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89
(2009). The decision is now under review at the state supreme court. 775 N.W.2d 745 (Mich.
2009).
76. For a thoughtful discussion of the cautions that Gideon may hold for a civil right to
counsel, see Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon v.
Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 527, 538 (2006). Deborah Rhode's piece in this
Symposium issue also catalogs the criticisms. Rhode, supra note 2, at 879-80.
77. Recent estimates in California put the pro per rate of family law litigants at 72 percent in
large counties and 67 percent in small counties. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, STATEWIDE
ACTION PLAN FOR SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 11 (2003), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/Ful -Report-comment-chart.pdf. In 2005,
New York's Office of Court Administration estimated that 75 percent of litigants in New York
City Family Court and 90 percent in Housing Court appeared without an attorney. Leber, supra
note 29, at 5.
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prioritizing cases in which the presence of an attorney is likely to
make a great difference in the outcome. However, legal services
programs may not consider streamlining the judicial process or
relieving the burden on the courts, especially in cases where neither
side is represented, as their top priority. In part, this is because many
legal services programs have missions that go well beyond simply
handling individual legal disputes, even though that function is
critical. For example, the stated mission of one of California's
largest legal services programs is to "provide[] quality legal services
that empower the poor to identify and defeat the causes and effects of
poverty."7 8  Mission statements from other legal services programs
often contain a similar focus on alleviating poverty or empowering
clients, not just assisting in the litigation of disputes. "
Related to this anti-poverty mission is the ability of local legal
services programs to set their own priorities and determine locally
whether and when to adopt an impact strategy, even if it means
turning down some individual cases. Local priority setting is
required for programs receiving federal funds from the Legal
Services Corporation,80 and the ability to do impact work is often a
highly valued part of a program's portfolio. Thus, advocates
sometimes fear that a legislative or court-ordered mandate to serve
all indigent clients in a particular subject area (for example, child
custody or evictions), will swamp these important law reform
78. Legal Services of Northern California, Mission Statement, http://www.lsnc.info/
Mission%20Statement (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
79. See, e.g., Legal Aid Society of Greater Cincinnati, Mission Statement, http://www.las
net.org/lasgc%20statement.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) ("The Legal Aid Society of Greater
Cincinnati is a nonprofit law firm dedicated to reducing poverty and ensuring family stability
through legal assistance."); Legal Aid Society of San Diego, Inc., Mission Statement,
http://www.lassd.org/mission%20statement.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) ("The Legal Aid
Society of San Diego, Inc. is . . . dedicated to providing equal access to justice for poor people
through aggressive, quality legal services. As legal advocates we will redress our clients' legal
problems, empower our clients to access and effectively participate with the legal, governmental
and social system and encourage self-empowerment in the fight against poverty and injustice.");
Coast to Coast Legal Aid of South Florida, Mission Statement, http://www.legalaid.org/
coasttocoast/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) ("The mission of Coast to Coast Legal Aid of South
Florida is to improve the lives of low income persons in our community through advocacy,
education, representation and empowerment."); Legal Aid of North Carolina, Mission Statement,
https://www.legalaidnc.org/Public/Learn/about-us/MissionStatementLANCDec12_03.aspx
(last visited Feb. 22, 2009) ("Legal Aid of North Carolina is a statewide, nonprofit law firm that
provides free legal services in civil matters to low-income people in order to ensure equal access
to justice and to remove legal barriers to economic opportunity.").
80. Public Welfare Priorities in Use of Resources, 45 C.F.R. § 1620.5(a) (2008).
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functions, or will threaten or eliminate resources for areas of law
where the right does not exist. The concern is especially acute if a
mandate seems unlikely to be accompanied by the substantial
funding needed to staff all cases of a particular type.
California's 2007 experience with a proposed pilot project to
expand representation in certain civil cases provides an illustration of
the potential for this type of tension among access to justice
players. 81 The pilot (proposed by Governor Schwarzenegger) would
have provided $5 million per year to fund representation as of right
for indigent litigants in certain civil cases in three counties. 82 Many
judges, especially some who sit in family court, enthusiastically
supported the pilot proposal. However, some legal services directors
were much more cautious. Indeed, the executive director of one of
California's largest programs spoke emphatically at a national
meeting about his disinclination to apply for funds under the pilot
program precisely because a mandate to serve so many new clients
might jeopardize the program's ability to conduct impact advocacy
and respond to local priorities, and might threaten the program's
ability to choose categories of clients based on other social justice
concerns, 83 such as a desire to represent only alleged victims and not
alleged perpetrators of domestic violence, or only tenants but not
landlords. Another director expressed to me privately his concern
that the pilot program was too focused on the concerns of judges and
not enough on the goal of service providers to alleviate poverty and
meet the needs of their clients.84 The postponement of California's
81. These observations are drawn from my experience and notes as a member of the Joint
Advisory Task Force on the Legal Representation Pilot Program (sponsored by the Judicial
Council of California, the California Commission on Access to Justice, and the Legal Aid
Association of California), as a participant in a panel on civil right to counsel at a Directors of
Litigation meeting sponsored by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in San
Francisco on June 23, 2008, as the facilitator of a right to counsel session at a California
Commission on Access to Justice event in April 2008, and at similar events since 2006. Some of
the Joint Task Force's recommendations are available at California Commission on Access to
Justice, Joint Advisory Task Force on the Legal Representation Pilot Program:
Recommendations, April 30, 2007, http://www.calegaladvocates.org/library/attachment. 103963.
82. See California Department of Finance, Governor's Budget 2007-08, Proposed Budget
Detail Judicial Branch, Major Program Changes, http://2007-08.archives.ebudget.ca.gov/
StateAgencyBudgets/0010/0250/department.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
83. Ramon Arias, Executive Dir., Bay Area Legal Aid, Remarks at the National Legal Aid &
Defender Association Litigation Directors Conference: Implementation of a Civil Right to
Counsel Workshop (June 23, 2008) (on file with author).
84. Id.
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pilot program until 2011 has offered the access to justice community
a new opportunity to make sure that working groups and strategists
heed these concerns, and to think more carefully about how the right
to counsel fits into the relationship between procedural and
substantive justice. 8
CONCLUSION
This is a promising time for advances who seek the availability
of counsel as of right to low-income litigants. I am convinced that
just as we now look back at the pre-Gideon landscape-less than
fifty years ago-and are astonished that a criminal defendant could
have been, in the not-very-distant past, charged, tried, convicted, and
sent to prison without ever receiving assistance from a lawyer, we
will before long look back at today and wonder how a person could
lose her children, her home, her job, her subsistence income, or her
health insurance without the aid of counsel. What is today routine
injustice must become unthinkable, and symposia like this one are
valuable steps on the way to achieving that new reality.
85. Cf Rhode, supra note 2, at 872-74 (discussing procedural and substantive justice
concerns).
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